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Does the Gender Composition 
of Scientific Committees Matter?†
By Manuel Bagues, Mauro Sylos-Labini, and Natalia Zinovyeva*
We analyze how a larger presence of female evaluators affects com-
mittee decision-making using information on 100,000 applications 
to associate and full professorships in Italy and Spain. These appli-
cations were assessed by 8,000 randomly selected evaluators. A 
larger number of women in evaluation committees does not increase 
either the quantity or the quality of female candidates who qual-
ify. Information from individual voting reports suggests that female 
evaluators are not significantly more favorable toward female can-
didates. At the same time, male evaluators become less favorable 
toward female candidates as soon as a female evaluator joins the 
committee. (JEL I23, J16, J71)
The underrepresentation of women in academia remains a cause for concern 
among universities and policymakers around the world. In Europe, women account 
for 47 percent of PhD graduates, 37 percent of associate professors, and only a mere 
21 percent of full professors (European Commission 2016). Similar patterns may 
be observed in the United States and the gender imbalance is even larger in Japan 
(National Research Council 2009; Abe 2012).
Several explanations may account for the lack of women in high-level positions. 
According to the pipeline theory, once women have entered the lower rungs of 
the academic career, it is mainly a matter of time that they would move their way 
through a metaphorical pipeline to reach high-level jobs. However, in most disci-
plines, the share of women among faculty members remains low even after decades 
of improved recruitment of women at the undergraduate and the doctoral level 
(Ginther and Kahn 2004, 2009). Gender differences in promotion rates might also 
reflect differences in productivity, perhaps due to the existence of gendered roles at 
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the household level or the lack of female mentors and role models (Blau et al. 2010). 
Some women may also devote excessive time to tasks that are socially desirable 
but which are not taken into account in promotion decisions (Babcock et al. 2017). 
Furthermore, some authors have pointed out that women are less likely to apply for 
promotions (Bosquet, Combes, and Garcia-Peñalosa 2013; De Paola, Ponzo, and 
Scoppa 2015), perhaps due to the existence of gender differences in the preference 
for competitive environments (Niederle and Vesterlund 2007; Buser, Niederle, and 
Oosterbeek 2014) or in bargaining abilities in the labor market (Babcock et al. 2006; 
Blackaby, Booth, and Frank 2005).
Beyond these supply-side explanations, the slow progress made by women has 
been sometimes attributed to the lack of female evaluators in the committees which 
decide on hiring and promotions. In this paper we examine whether the presence 
of women in scientific committees might help to increase the chances of success of 
female candidates and to improve the quality of the evaluations. There are several 
reasons for considering this hypothesis. First, there is evidence of gender segrega-
tion across different scientific subfields (Dolado, Felgueroso, and Almunia 2012; 
Hale and Regev 2014). If men and women tend to do research in different subfields 
and evaluators overrate the importance of their own types of research, the lack of 
female evaluators might be detrimental for female candidates (Bagues and Perez-
Villadoniga 2012, 2013). Second, research networks tend to be gendered (Boschini 
and SjÖgren 2007; Hilmer and Hilmer 2007).1 If evaluators are mostly male, male 
candidates might have a better chance to be acquainted with committee members 
and could perhaps benefit from these connections (Zinovyeva and Bagues 2015; 
Bagues, Sylos-Labini, and Zinovyeva 2015). Third, men might hold more negative 
stereotypes of women than other women do or they may be biased against women 
reaching high-level positions. For instance, according to the World Value Survey, 
around 25 percent of US males believe that men make better political leaders and 16 
percent think than men make better business executives. Women are half as likely 
to hold such views. A similar pattern is observed in Europe.2 According to some 
authors, similar biases are also present in the academic world.3 Fourth, the presence 
of women in evaluation committees might also improve the quality of the evalu-
ation. It has been argued that group performance is positively correlated with the 
proportion of women in the group (Woolley et al. 2010). The presence of women in 
1 Boschini and SjÖgren (2007) show that coauthoring is not gender neutral in Economics. Hilmer and Hilmer 
(2007) observe that in the United States, 55 percent of the economics PhD students being advised by women are 
female, while only 18 percent of economics PhD students advised by men are female. 
2 World Value Survey Wave 6: 2010–2014. Official aggregate v.20140429. World Values Survey Association 
(www.worldvaluessurvey.org). 
3 Gender discrimination in academia remains a controversial issue. According to meta-analyses by Ceci and 
Williams (2011) and Ceci et al. (2014), the more recent empirical evidence fails to provide any clear support to 
the assertions of discrimination in manuscript reviewing, interviewing, and hiring. However, other studies find 
that female researchers might still receive lower evaluations than male researchers with identical characteristics 
(Steinpreis, Anders, and Ritzke 1999; Moss-Racusin et al. 2012). Some experts in gender studies have also argued 
that male evaluators discriminate against female candidates. For instance, in a report commissioned by the European 
Commission, the expert group Women In Research Decision Making concludes that “… at the very least, having 
male only committees risks replicating stereotypes and bias, both regarding applicants and issues in research” 
(European Commission 2008, p. 27). Another expert report on the situation of women researchers in Spain asserts 
that “there are prejudices about women among those who co-opt, promote or have the key to promotion. The bodies 
which control this are mostly male and, even if they are not totally conscious of it, they see an academic woman first 
as a woman and secondly as a colleague” (Fundación Española para la Ciencia y la Tecnología 2005, p. 48). Other 
researchers have voiced similar views (Barres 2006; Smith et al. 2015). 
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scientific boards might not only help to achieve gender balance in the academic pro-
fession, but it can also make science more meritocratic and invigorate its progress.
These arguments seem to have reached policymakers. A number of countries 
have introduced quotas requiring that scientific committees be at least 40 percent 
female (and male) and many universities and scientific institutions have their own 
internal guidelines ensuring the presence of both genders in committees.4 However, 
despite the increasing popularity of gender quotas in scientific committees, there are 
concerns about their effectiveness. Quotas are costly for senior female researchers, 
as they increase disproportionately the amount of time that they have to devote to 
evaluation committees (Vernos 2013). Furthermore, a larger presence of women in 
committees may not necessarily benefit female candidates. Both men and women 
have developed their careers in an academic environment dominated by men, and 
both genders may tend to associate important academic positions, and the features 
they require, with men, not with women (Méndez and Busenbark 2015). And even 
if women are relatively more sympathetic toward female candidates, they may 
not have equal levels of voice and authority in deliberation processes (Karpowitz, 
Mendelberg, and Shaker 2012; Brescoll 2011). The presence of women in the com-
mittee can also induce male evaluators to be less favorable toward female candidates. 
Past research on group dynamics suggests that men might not respond favorably to 
the presence of gender diversity, particularly in domains that men have historically 
dominated (Crocker and McGraw 1984). Female evaluators can also contribute to 
strengthen male identity (Akerlof and Kranton 2000) or they can trigger a licensing 
effect (Monin and Miller 2001; Khan and Dhar 2006).
A better understanding of the impact of scientific committees’ gender com-
position on recruitment and promotion decisions is crucial in order to determine 
whether quotas are desirable. The empirical evidence has been so far inconclusive 
and typically based on small samples. Sometimes researchers seem to benefit from 
the presence of evaluators who share the same gender (Casadevall and Handelsman 
2014; De Paola and Scoppa 2015), sometimes they seem to obtain relatively better 
evaluations from opposite-sex evaluators (Broder 1993; Ellemers et al. 2004), and 
in some other cases gender does not seem to play any (statistically) significant role 
(Abrevaya and Hamermesh 2012; Jayasinghe, Marsh, and Bond 2003; Milkman, 
Akinola, and Chugh 2015; Moss-Racusin et al. 2012; Steinpreis, Anders, and Ritzke 
1999; Williams and Ceci 2015). A brief summary of these studies is available in 
online Appendix A. It is unclear whether these mixed findings reflect the idiosyncra-
sies of the different situations and samples analyzed in each study, or simple random 
sampling variation. The empirical literature also does not shed light on the mech-
anisms through which a higher presence of female evaluators in committees may 
benefit female candidates. From a policy perspective, the lack of more extensive and 
clear evidence is disappointing.5
4 Gender quotas in scientific committees were introduced in 1995 in Finland (amendment of the Act on Equality 
between Women and Men, Act No. 624/1992 and No. 206/1995), in 2007 in Spain (Constitutional Act 3/2007 of 22 
March for Effective Equality between Women and Men), and in 2014 in France (decree No. 2014–997, September 
2, 2014). The European Commission has also committed to reaching a target of 40 percent female participation in 
its advisory structures for Horizon 2020, the European Union’s research and innovation program for 2014–2020. 
5 A related literature also analyzes the role of evaluators’ gender in nonacademic occupations (Bagues and 
Esteve-Volart 2010; Bertrand et al. 2014; Booth and Leigh 2010; Kunze and Miller 2014), in sport activities 
(Sandberg 2016), or in the lab (Bohnet, van Geen, and Bazerman 2015). In general, in these studies evaluators’ 
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In this paper we analyze the role of evaluators’ gender in academic evaluations 
using the exceptional evidence provided by two large-scale randomized natural 
experiments in two different countries: Italy and Spain. The representation of women 
in Italian and Spanish universities is similar to their representation in other European 
countries and the United States. Despite having achieved parity at the lower rungs 
of the academic ladder, women are still underrepresented in top academic positions. 
They account for approximately one-half of new PhD graduates, one-third of asso-
ciate professors, but only one-fifth of full professors in both countries.6 The Spanish 
and Italian institutional arrangements offer several unique features. In order to be 
either promoted or hired by a university at the level of associate or full professor, 
researchers are required to first obtain a qualification granted by a centralized com-
mittee at the national level. In these nationwide examinations, which are performed 
periodically in all disciplines in both countries, evaluators are selected from a pool 
of eligible professors using a random draw. This allows us to consistently esti-
mate the causal effect of committees’ gender composition on evaluations. We also 
observe extensive and detailed information on evaluators’ and candidates’ research 
production, academic connections, and their subfield of specialization. We exploit 
this information to explore the different mechanisms suggested by the theory about 
the role of committees’ gender composition. Each country also offers some com-
parative advantage in terms of data availability. We use individual voting reports, 
available in Italy, to study the voting behavior of male and female evaluators within 
each committee. In Spain, we can observe the future productivity of promoted can-
didates. We use this information to examine the quality of the assessments granted 
by committees with different gender compositions. As we explain in more detail in 
Section I, there exist also a number of interesting institutional differences between 
the evaluation processes in the two countries. Having data for the two different insti-
tutional arrangements allows us to cross-validate the findings and to explore their 
robustness.
Our database includes information on all qualification exams that were conducted 
in Italy in years 2012–2014 and in Spain in years 2002–2006. Overall, these eval-
uations involved approximately 100,000 applications and 8,000 evaluators in all 
disciplines. Evaluation committees, which include five members in Italy and seven 
members in Spain, are composed mostly by men. Approximately one-third of eval-
uation committees do not include any women, in one-third there is just one female 
evaluator, and in one-third of committees there are two or more women, but very 
rarely do we observe a female majority.
In both countries, male applicants tend to be more successful than female appli-
cants. In Italy, approximately 38 percent of men receive a positive evaluation, 
 compared to 35 percent of women. In Spain, 12 percent of male applicants qualify, 
gender is not relevant, with the exception of Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010), who document that female appli-
cants to the Spanish judiciary have lower chances of being hired when they are randomly assigned to an evaluation 
committee including women. 
6 In Italy, women account for 52 percent of new PhD graduates, 36 percent of associate professors, and 21 per-
cent of full professors (Italian Ministry of Education, University, and Research (MIUR) 2016). In Spain, women 
account for 49 percent of new PhD graduates, 40 percent of associate professors, and 21 percent of full professors 
(Spanish Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports (MECD) 2016). According to information from individuals 
who obtained a PhD in the 1990s in Spain, female graduates are one-half as likely to attain full professorship than 
male graduates (Sanchez de Madariaga, de la Rica, and Dolado 2011). 
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while the success rate among female applicants is equal to 11 percent. When we take 
into account candidates’ observable productivity, the remaining gender gap is equal 
to 1.5 percentage points (pp) in Italy and 1.4 pp in Spain, and it is statistically sig-
nificant in both countries. We find no empirical support, neither from the average in 
the two countries nor from the majority of subsamples analyzed, to suggest that the 
presence of women in evaluation committees decreases the gender gap in a statisti-
cally or economically significant way. On the contrary, in Italy, gender-mixed com-
mittees exhibit a significantly larger gender gap than committees composed only 
of male evaluators. An extra woman in a committee of five members increases the 
gender gap by somewhere between 0.4 and 3.3 pp, considering a 95 percent confi-
dence interval. In the Spanish case, we can reject any sizable impact. An additional 
woman in a committee of seven members may decrease the gender gap by at most 
0.5 pp or it might also increase it by up to 1 pp.
We also examine whether committees with a relatively larger proportion of 
women promote better candidates, using as a proxy of candidates’ quality their 
research output before the evaluation and, in the case of Spain, also their research 
output during the following five years. We do not observe any significant difference 
in the past or future observable quality of candidates who have qualified in commit-
tees with different gender compositions.
Evidence from 300,000 individual voting reports, available in the case of Italy, 
suggests that there are two main factors that explain why female candidates do not 
benefit from a larger presence of women in committees. In mixed gender commit-
tees, female evaluators rate female applicants higher than their male colleagues, 
but the difference is small and statistically nonsignificant. At the same time, the 
presence of female evaluators in committees makes male evaluators tougher upon 
female candidates, perhaps reflecting a licensing effect or male identity priming.
To gain a better understanding of why female evaluators do not exhibit a stronger 
same-sex preference and also to determine the validity of our findings in other con-
texts, we explore why none of the standard theories predicting that a larger presence 
of women in committees helps female candidates plays a major role in this con-
text. First, we consider the gendered networks hypothesis. As expected, we find that 
research networks tend to be gendered in both countries. Female professors are sig-
nificantly more likely to have an advisor, a colleague, or a coauthor of the same gen-
der. We also observe that committees tend to favor connected candidates. However, 
the likelihood of having a connection in a national committee is relatively low and, 
therefore, networks have only a limited effect on the evaluation outcomes. Second, 
we examine the role of gender segregation across research subfields. At the level at 
which evaluations were conducted, around 200 different fields, gender segregation 
turns out to be relatively small. As a result, while evaluators tend to prefer candi-
dates with a similar research profile, the impact of gender segregation on evaluations 
is negligible. Third, we study gender stereotypes. Stereotypes are expected to be 
more relevant when evaluators cannot observe accurately the quality of candidates, 
for instance because evaluators and candidates are specialized in different subfields 
of research. The influence of stereotypes on evaluation outcomes seems to increase, 
not decrease, when there are women in the committee. Finally, we also examine sep-
arately evaluations for high-level positions. Male evaluators might have prejudices 
against women being promoted to full professorships, but not to positions at lower 
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levels of the career ladder. Results are mixed: we find support for this hypothesis in 
the case of Spain, but not in the case of Italy.
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. We provide the first 
large-scale assessment of the causal impact of the gender composition of scientific 
committees. There is no evidence suggesting that, in the two evaluation systems 
considered in this study, female candidates benefit from the presence of a larger 
share of women in evaluation committees. We also examine explicitly the relevance 
of the different theoretical arguments that have been proposed in the literature in 
favor of increasing the share of women in committees. This analysis helps to assess 
the external validity of our findings and, as we discuss in detail in the final section of 
the paper, it provides a better understanding of when gender quotas might be desir-
able. Finally, we open the black box of committee decision-making and we analyze 
the voting behavior of individual committee members. Our findings suggest that 
interactions within committees might exacerbate the impact of gender stereotypes.
I. Institutional Background
Several European countries have national evaluation systems which are meant to 
guarantee the academic quality of professors in public universities. The evidence 
presented in this paper is based on an analysis of two variants of such systems: the 
Italian system known as Abilitazione Scientifica Nazionale, which was introduced in 
2012, and the Spanish system known as Habilitación, which was in place between 
2002 and 2006.
Both systems require candidates for associate and full professorships to qualify 
in national evaluations held by an academic board in the appropriate discipline. In 
each country, there are nearly 200 legally defined academic disciplines, each corre-
sponding to a certain area of knowledge. Successful candidates can then apply for 
a position at a given university. The timeline of evaluations has the following steps. 
First, a call for applicants is announced in which candidates can apply for multiple 
disciplines and positions. When the list of applicants is settled, committee members 
are randomly selected from the list of eligible evaluators in the corresponding disci-
pline. Once the committees are formed, the evaluation process begins and once this 
is over, the evaluation results are made public. Rostered evaluators can potentially 
resign at any point of the process, something that happens in 2 percent of cases in 
Spain and in 8 percent of cases in Italy. Resigned evaluators are substituted by ran-
domly selected evaluators.
The procedure has also distinctive features specific to each country. In Spain, 
evaluations involve oral presentations by the candidates, while in Italy evaluations 
are based only on candidates’ CVs and publications. In Spain, qualification leads 
almost automatically to promotion, while in Italy the chances to get promoted con-
ditional on obtaining qualification are much lower. The Italian system is relatively 
more transparent and exposed to public scrutiny. Nonetheless, in both systems there 
seems to be room for subjectivity. For instance, Zinovyeva and Bagues (2015) and 
Bagues, Sylos-Labini, and Zinovyeva (2015) document that the presence of a coau-
thor or a colleague in the evaluation committee has a significant positive impact on 
candidates’ chances of success in both countries.
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We describe in detail the main features of each system below. This information is 
also summarized in online Appendix B.
A. Abilitazione Scientifica Nazionale
In Italy, four out of five committee members are selected through a random draw 
from the pool of “Italian” eligible evaluators and the remaining evaluator is drawn 
out of the pool of “foreign” eligible evaluators. The former pool consists of full 
professors affiliated to Italian universities who volunteered to be members. The lat-
ter pool consists of professors affiliated to universities from OECD countries, who 
also voluntarily participate in Italian evaluations. The randomization procedure is 
subject to one important constraint: no university can have more than one evaluator 
within a single committee.
The eligibility of evaluators is decided in the following way. In science, technol-
ogy, engineering, mathematics, medicine, and psychology (STEMM), evaluators 
are required to have a research output above the median for full professors in the 
discipline in at least two of the following three dimensions: (i) the number of articles 
published in scientific journals, (ii) the number of citations, (iii) and the H-index. 
In the social sciences and the humanities (SSH), the research performance of eval-
uators has to be above the median in at least one of the following three dimensions: 
(i) the number of articles published in high quality scientific journals (henceforth, 
A-journals),7 (ii) the overall number of articles published in any scientific journals 
and book chapters, and (iii) the number of published books. “Foreign” eligible eval-
uators have to satisfy the same requirements. While “Italian” evaluators work pro 
bono, “OECD” evaluators receive €16,000 for their participation.
Evaluations are based solely on the material provided in candidates’ application 
packages consisting of CVs and recent publications. Committees have full auton-
omy regarding the criteria to be used in the evaluation and the number of qualifi-
cations to be granted. Each evaluation committee is required to draft and publish 
online a document describing the general criteria to be used in providing a positive 
assessment. Candidates may withdraw their application up until two weeks after 
evaluation criteria are publicized. A positive assessment of the candidate requires 
a qualified majority of four out of five votes. Once granted, qualifications are only 
valid for four years, while a negative evaluation means that candidates are excluded 
from participating in further national evaluations during the following two years.
An important feature of the Italian system is its extreme transparency: all the 
relevant information—including candidates’ and evaluators’ CVs, as well as indi-
vidual evaluation reports—is published online. An independent evaluation agency 
appointed by the ministry also collects and publicizes information on the research 
output of final candidates in the ten years preceding the evaluation, as measured by 
the three bibliometric indicators described above. The evaluation agency compares 
the research productivity of candidates in each of these three dimensions with the 
research productivity of professors in the category to which they applied, and com-
mittees are asked to take this information into consideration.
7 An evaluation agency determined with the help of several scientific committees the set of journals to be con-
sidered as high quality in each field. 
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B. Habilitación
In Spain, committees are composed of seven members. In evaluations for full 
professorships, all evaluators are full professors based in Spanish universities or 
research institutes. In evaluations for associate professorships, three committee 
members are full professors and four evaluators are associate professors. No more 
than one non-university researcher is allowed to be selected as a member of the 
committee for a given exam. Similarly, no more than one emeritus professor may be 
selected as a member of a given committee.
In order to be eligible, evaluators are required to satisfy some minimum research 
level which is assessed by the Spanish education authority.8 This requirement is 
satisfied by approximately 81 percent of full professors and 70 percent of associate 
professors. Unlike the Italian system, where participation is voluntary, in Spain all 
eligible professors can be selected to serve in committees.
Candidates for evaluation are required to make several oral presentations in front 
of a committee. For candidates to full professorships, these exams have two qualify-
ing stages. In the first stage, each candidate presents the CV and then, in the second 
stage, an example of his or her research work. Exams for the position of associate 
professor, in addition to these two stages, have an intermediate stage where candi-
dates give a lecture on a topic randomly chosen from a syllabus proposed by the 
candidate. In each stage, evaluations are made on a majority basis. Qualifications 
have unlimited validity once they have been granted. The number of qualifications 
conceded at the national level is very limited and being accredited is, in most cases, 
equivalent to being promoted.
II. Data
We use data on all evaluations from the first edition of the Italian Abilitazione 
Scientifica Nazionale (years 2012–2014) and on all evaluations from the Spanish 
Habilitación (years 2002–2006). In Italy, the data include information on 184 com-
mittees, one per each academic discipline. Each committee assessed both applications 
to associate and to full professorships. In Spain, there are in total 967 committees in 
174 disciplines, of which 502 are committees evaluating candidates for full profes-
sorships and 465 evaluating candidates for associate professorships.
The dataset includes information on eligible and actually selected evaluators, 
applicants, and the final outcome of the evaluation. In addition to demographic 
characteristics and a number of productivity measures, we have also gathered infor-
mation on research networks and research specialization. In online Appendix C we 
provide detailed information on how this information was collected, and how each 
variable was constructed. Below, we briefly summarize the main features of the 
dataset.
8 The Spanish education authority determines professors’ eligibility according to the number of sexenios com-
pleted. Sexenios are granted periodically by the ministry on the basis of applicants’ research output in any uninter-
rupted period of a maximum of six years. Eligible associate professors are required to have held at least one sexenio 
while eligible full professors are required to have held at least two sexenios. 
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A. Evaluators
In Italy, 39 percent of Italian female full professors and 41 percent of Italian male 
full professors volunteered and were considered eligible to sit in evaluation commit-
tees. The list of eligible evaluators includes 5,876 professors based in Italian univer-
sities and 1,365 evaluators based in OECD universities. In the average field, the pool 
of eligible evaluators includes 32 “Italian” professors and 8 “foreign” professors. 
While approximately 20 percent of Italian evaluators are women, the foreign pool 
is less feminized and only 12 percent of foreign evaluators are women. Taking into 
account the composition of both pools, the expected share of women in the com-
mittee is around 18 percent, which is similar to the initial share of women in actual 
committees.9 Approximately 1 out of every 13 evaluators resigned and was replaced 
by another eligible evaluator. These replacements slightly increased the share of 
women in committees to 19 percent, but the difference is not statistically significant. 
Forty-one percent of committees include no women at all, in 35 percent there is one 
woman, in 16 percent there are two women, and only 8 percent of committees have 
a majority of female evaluators.
Table C1 in online Appendix C provides descriptive information on eligible eval-
uators based in Italy.10 On average, they have been in a full professor position for 
13 years. They list 131 publications in their CVs, of which just over one-half are 
articles in scientific journals, and the rest are books, book chapters, publications in 
conference proceedings, patents, etc. Around one-half of these publications were 
published during the previous ten years. To assess the quality of research output, in 
STEMM disciplines we compute their total Article Influence Score, summing up the 
Article Influence Score of all publications; in SSH disciplines we use the number 
of articles in A-journals.11 About 28 percent of eligible professors are based in the 
south of Italy.
In columns 2–4, we compare characteristics of male and female evaluators. For 
this comparison, we normalize all variables at the discipline level. Female evalua-
tors have significantly shorter tenure than their male counterparts and they also have 
lower research output in almost all dimensions. They are less likely to be based in 
the south, but this difference is not significant.
In Spain, the lists of eligible evaluators include 49,199 full professors and 
61,052  associate professors.12 Women constitute 35 percent of eligible associate 
professors, but only 14 percent of full professors are women. Taking into account the 
composition of both pools, the expected share of women in the committee is around 
19 percent. This figure is similar to the share of women in the initial set of com-
mittees selected by random draw and is unaffected by the resignation of 2  percent 
9 We have calculated the expected gender composition of committees using a simulation with one million draws, 
taking into account that the lottery which decided committee composition was subject to the constraint that commit-
tees cannot include more than one member from the same university. 
10 Unfortunately, we were unable to gather systematic information on foreign evaluators. In their case, the offi-
cial CVs are not in a standardized format and they are often incomplete. 
11 Article Influence Score is available for all journals in the Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge. It is related 
to Impact Factor, but it takes into account the quality of the citing journals, the propensity to cite across journals, 
and it excludes self-citations. 
12 The Spanish data cover information from several evaluation waves, so many professors appear in the lists 
several times. In total, there are 7,963 individual full professors and 21,979 individual associate professors in these 
lists. 
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of evaluators. Overall, 32 percent of committees are composed of only male evalu-
ators, 29 percent of committees have one woman on board, 22 percent include two 
women, 11 percent three women, and only 6 percent have more women than men.
We collect information on the research outcomes of Spanish researchers from 
several sources. We observe their publications in international journals covered by 
Web of Knowledge and their articles and books in the Spanish language included in 
the database Dialnet, as well as patents in the European Patent Office in which these 
researchers are listed as inventors. We also have information on their activity as 
PhD advisors and as members of dissertation committees. We compare female and 
male eligible evaluators, normalizing their characteristics at the level of exam and 
category. Results are very similar to the ones observed for the Italian academia (see 
columns 6–8 and 10–12 of Table C1). Female eligible evaluators are younger, have 
shorter tenure, and on average they published less than male researchers in the same 
discipline and rank. They have also lower accumulated quality-adjusted scientific 
production, they tend to participate less in advising and evaluating doctoral students, 
and they are relatively less likely to come from universities located in the southern 
regions of the country.13
B. Candidates
There were 69,020 applications in Italy. On average, there were 375 applications 
per field, with 117 of them participating in evaluations for full professor positions 
and 258 participating in evaluations for associate professor positions. Some can-
didates applied to more than one position: the average candidate participated in 
1.5 evaluations.
As shown in the upper panel of online Appendix Table C2, 31 percent of applica-
tions for the position of full professor and 41 percent of applications for the position 
of associate professor were submitted by women. Candidates for a full professorship 
are about 49 years old and candidates for an associate professorship are 6 years 
younger. About one-half of the applicants for associate professorships hold a per-
manent contract and about three-fourths of applicants for full professorships do. 
Candidates mainly apply for an evaluation in the field in which they currently hold 
a permanent contract.
Female applicants tend to be younger among applicants for associate professor-
ships, and they are of a similar age as their male counterparts in evaluations for full 
professorships (columns 3–5 and 8–10 of online Appendix Table C2). In both cases, 
the publication record of female candidates is significantly weaker. The only dimen-
sion in which women seem to be achieving better results than men is in publishing 
conference proceedings. In addition to information on productivity coming from 
candidates’ CVs, we observe the order in which candidates submitted their appli-
cations. In principle, the timing of the application might reflect both candidates’ 
self-confidence and quality. We normalize this variable uniformly between 0 and 1. 
We observe that female candidates for the post of full professor apply a bit later than 
their male counterparts, but no similar gender difference can be observed among 
13 In Spain, we define A-journals following the journal rank developed by Dialnet, which categorizes journals 
in four groups according to their prestige. 
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candidates for associate professor positions. In Italy, approximately 14 percent of 
applications were withdrawn once the identity and the criteria of evaluators were 
made public. Withdrawals were more common among female applicants. Overall, 
approximately 38 percent of applications by male candidates and 35 percent of 
applications by female candidates were successful.
As explained above, the evaluation agency of the Ministry of Education published 
detailed information regarding the research production of the final set of applicants 
in the 10 previous years. Around 38 percent of candidates were above the median in 
each of the three corresponding bibliometric dimensions. Performance according to 
these indicators is strongly correlated with success. Among those candidates whose 
quality was below the median in every dimension there was a success rate of only 
4 percent, while among those who excelled in every dimension there was a success 
rate of 63 percent.
In addition to the final decision of the committee, we also collected information on 
the individual evaluation reports, available in the case of Italy. Overall, we observe 
around 300,000 individual reports. Forty-five percent of these reports were favorable 
to the candidate and most of the time decisions were taken unanimously (in 86 per-
cent of the cases). Unanimity is relatively more frequent when applicants are below 
the median in each of the three corresponding bibliometric dimensions (93 percent) 
and when applicants are above the median in all three dimensions (86 percent), and 
it is lower when applicants are above the median only in one (84 percent) or two 
dimensions (82 percent).
In Spain, overall there were 13,444 applications for full professorships and 
17,799 applications for associate professorships (lower panel of online Appendix 
Table C2). The gender ratios among applicants are very similar to the ones in Italy: 
around 27 percent of applicants to full professor are women and there are around 
40 percent of women among applicants to associate professor. Once again, male 
applicants seem to have stronger research records than their female counterparts. 
They also tend to be slightly more successful in evaluations.
Finally, for the candidates who qualified in Spain, we collected information on 
their individual research productivity in a five-year period following the national 
evaluations and, for those qualified for a position of an associate professor, on their 
performance in future evaluations for promotion to full professor. This information 
allows us to assess the quality of selection not only in terms of candidate charac-
teristics easily observable at the moment of the exam, but also in terms of dimen-
sions that are difficult to observe but that are nevertheless important determinants of 
future productivity.
C. Connections
We identify professional links between candidates and eligible evaluators. We 
consider all the possible interactions within each discipline, around 2.5 million 
possible pairs in Italy and 5.5 million in Spain. As shown in online Appendix Table 
C3, the probability that a candidate and an eligible evaluator are affiliated to the 
same institution is around 3 percent in Italy and 5 percent in Spain. The probability 
that they have coauthored a paper is smaller: 1.4 percent in Italy and 0.4 percent 
in Spain.
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In the case of Spain, we also observe if there was a student-advisor relationship 
or if the candidate and the eligible evaluator have participated in the same thesis 
committee.14 These links are relatively rare: in 0.2 percent of the cases the eligible 
evaluator is the PhD thesis director of the candidate and in 1.3 percent they have 
participated in the same thesis committee.
Male candidates tend to have more coauthors among eligible evaluators and they 
are more likely to have interacted with an eligible evaluator previously in a thesis 
committee (online Appendix Table C3, columns 3–5).
D. Research Similarity
We also collect information on the overlap of research interests between candi-
dates and eligible evaluators. Due to data availability, there are some differences in 
how we define research similarity in the two countries. In the case of Italy, we have 
information on the field and also on the subfield where researchers with a permanent 
contract in an Italian university are officially registered. There are 184 fields (settore 
concorsuale) and approximately 370 subfields (settore scientifico-disciplinare).15 
In about 60 percent of the cases the candidate and the eligible evaluator belong to 
the same subfield (Table C3).
In the case of Spanish researchers, we infer their research interests using infor-
mation on their participation in doctoral dissertations, either as authors, advisors, or 
committee members. In Spain, all doctoral theses are classified in more than 2,000 
categories.16 Economics, for example, is divided into 100 different research fields 
(e.g., labor economics). We construct a measure of the overlap of the research inter-
ests of candidates and evaluators based on the subfield of every dissertation where 
they have been involved. In the spirit of Jaffe (1986) and Bloom, Schankerman, and 
Van Reenen (2013), we measure research proximity between individuals  i and  j as the 
angular separation of the vectors  S i = ( S 1i , … ,  S Ci ) and  S j = ( S 1j , … ,  S Cj ) , where  S Ci 
is the share of dissertations in category  C in which individual  i has been involved:
(1)  Overla p ij =   S i  S j ′ ____________  (  S i  S i ′  ) 1/2 (  S j  S j ′  ) 1/2  .
This index takes value 1 if two individuals have participated in dissertations in the 
same subfields in the same proportion and value 0 if there is no overlap. On average, 
in our sample the degree of overlap between candidates and evaluators is equal to 
0.20. As shown in Table C3, female candidates are slightly more likely than male 
candidates to share their research interests with eligible evaluators.
14 We consider three possible interactions: (i) the evaluator was a member of candidate’s thesis committee; (ii) 
one of them had invited the other to sit in her students’ thesis committee; or (ii) both of them sat in the same student 
thesis committee. 
15 Historically, each Italian researcher was a assigned to certain settore scientifico-disciplinare. More recently, 
upon the introduction of the new system of competitive exams, researchers were assigned also to a settore concor-
suale. The correspondence between the two classifications is not always unique, in some cases researchers belong-
ing to the same settore scientifico-disciplinare may be assigned to different settore concorsuale. 
16 The author of the dissertation selects the subfield using the International Standard Nomenclature for Fields of 
Science and Technology, a system developed by UNESCO. 
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III. Empirical Analysis
We start our analysis by providing descriptive information on the average suc-
cess rate of male and female applicants, unconditional and conditional on their 
observable research productivity. Then we investigate how the gender composition 
of committees affects the success rate of male and female candidates, candidates’ 
decision to withdraw their application, and the quality of male and female applicants 
who qualify. To achieve a better understanding of the observed patterns, we use the 
information provided by individual voting reports to examine how male and female 
evaluators vote within the same committee. We examine whether male and female 
evaluators vote differently depending on the gender of applicants, and we also inves-
tigate whether the presence of women in a committee affects the voting behavior of 
male evaluators. Finally, we explore the relevance of the main theories according to 
which evaluators’ gender may be relevant.
A. Gender Gap
We estimate the gender gap separately for the applicants in the two countries 
using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method:
(2)  Y ie =  β 0 +  β 1 Femal e i +  X i  β 2 +  μ e +  ϵ ie ,
where  Y ie is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if candidate  i qualifies in evaluation 
e and takes value 0 if the candidate receives a negative evaluation or withdraws the 
application before receiving the evaluation. Each evaluation  e refers to the exam-
ination that was conducted in a given field and position (e.g., qualification for an 
associate professorship in Applied Economics in Spain in year 2005);  Femal e i is a 
dummy variable indicating the gender of the candidate and  X i includes all (normal-
ized) productivity indicators and individual characteristics listed in Table C2. We 
allow the effect of productivity indicators to vary across disciplinary groups, and the 
effect of age and contract type to vary across disciplinary groups and levels of pro-
motion. Evaluation fixed effects ( μ e ) control for any differences across evaluations 
that might affect the success rate of male and female candidates in a similar way. 
Throughout the analysis, we cluster standard errors at the committee level.
In Italy, the success rate of female candidates is 2.8 pp lower than male candidates 
in the same exam, unconditional on any measure of quality (Table 1, column 1, upper 
panel). In Spain, the unconditional gender gap is equal to 2.2 pp (column 1, lower 
panel). In both countries, approximately one-half of the gender gap can be explained 
by the differences in observable characteristics (column 2). The remaining conditional 
gender gap is equal to 1.5 pp in Italy (4 percent relative to the success rate of men) and 
1.4 pp in Spain (12 percent), and it is statistically significant in both countries.
It is unclear whether the remaining gap should be attributed to evaluators biases 
or to differences in unobservable characteristics. There may be substantial differ-
ences in the quality of male and female candidates which are not fully captured 
by our controls. Furthermore, the individual proxies of quality that we use in our 
analysis, such as position, affiliation, or publications might also be the outcome of 
discriminatory processes, which would further hinder the interpretation of  β 1 .
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B. The Impact of Committees’ Gender Composition on the Chances of Success 
of Male and Female Candidates
We examine whether the gender composition of committees affects the success 
rate of male and female applicants. In order to obtain causal estimates, our analysis 
exploits the random assignment of evaluators to committees. We compare the per-
formance of applicants who initially were expected to face an evaluation committee 
with the same gender composition but, due to the random draw, were assigned to 
committees with a different number of female evaluators. Given that a few of the 
evaluators who were initially selected eventually declined to participate and were 
substituted by other (randomly selected) evaluators, first we report results from an 
intention-to-treat analysis where our independent variable is the gender composition 
of the initial set of evaluators. Later on, we instrument the gender composition of the 
Table 1—The Causal Impact of Committees’ Gender Composition
Qualified Applied
OLS OLS ITT IV IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Italy
Female candidate −0.028 −0.015 −0.004 0.001 0.008 0.009 −0.026
(0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
Share of women in committee 0.000 −0.0004 — — —
(0.059) (0.071)
Female candidate × share −0.092 −0.116 −0.128 −0.132 −0.025
 of women in committee (0.036) (0.050) (0.035) (0.036) (0.026)
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.240 0.245 0.245 0.236 0.236 0.075
Observations 69,020 69,020 69,020 69,020 69,020 69,020 69,020
Mean dep. var. (for men) 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.87
Spain
Female candidate −0.022 −0.014 −0.009 −0.009 −0.011 −0.010
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Share of women in committee 0.011 0.012 — —
(0.017) (0.018)
Female candidate × share −0.018 −0.019 −0.016 −0.022
 of women in committee (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.036 0.039 0.039 0.005 0.005
Observations 31,243 31,243 31,243 31,243 31,243 31,243
Mean dep. var. (for men) 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
Controls for both panels
Candidate characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exam FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Expected share of women Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Female candidate × Expected 
 share of women
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Committee characteristics Yes
Notes: Candidate characteristics include all individual predetermined characteristics listed in online Appendix 
Table C2. Committee characteristics include the interaction between candidates’ gender and the average tenure of 
evaluators (Italy only), their age (Spain only), their quality-adjusted productivity during the previous ten years, and 
the proportion of committee members based in the South. The first-stage results for the IV estimations reported in 
columns 4 and 5 are available in online Appendix Table D1. Standard errors are clustered by committee.
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committee which actually evaluated applicants using the gender composition of the 
committee initially drawn.
Intention-to-Treat Analysis.—We estimate the following equation on the pool of 
applicants using OLS:17
(3)  Y ie =  β 0 +  β 1 Femal e i +  β 2 Femal e e initial +  β 3 Femal e i × Femal e e initial 
 +  β 4 Femal e e expected +  β 5 Femal e i × Femal e e expected +  X i  β 6 +  ϵ ie ,
where  Femal e e initial represents the share of female evaluators in the committee that 
was initially randomly drawn, before any evaluator resigned, and  Femal e e expected is 
the expected share of women in this committee, calculated based on the composition 
of the pool of eligible evaluators and the rules that determine the draw.18 In order to 
increase the accuracy of the estimation, we also include applicants’ predetermined 
characteristics ( X i ) and, in some specifications, evaluation fixed effects ( μ e ).
Coefficient  β 2 captures the causal effect of committees’ initial gender com-
position upon the success rate of male candidates, and coefficient  β 3 shows how 
the gender gap varies depending on the share of women in the committee. Since 
Femal e e initial is computed using the initial assignment of evaluators, coefficients  β 2 
and  β 3 provide intention-to-treat estimates. The causal interpretation of  β 2 and  β 3 
relies on the assumption that the assignment was indeed random. The way in which 
the randomization was conducted in each country suggests that there was little 
room for manipulation.19 Nonetheless, before moving into the discussion of the 
impact of committees’ gender composition on candidates’ chances of success, we 
verify empirically that, conditional on the expected composition of the committee, 
its actual composition is uncorrelated with any observable predetermined factor. 
We estimate equation (3) using predetermined characteristics included in  X i as out-
come variables instead of controls. As expected, the evidence is consistent with the 
assignment being indeed random. Table 2 shows estimation results for the 11 pre-
determined variables that are common for Italian and Spanish databases. Out of 
44 coefficients, only 2 are significantly different from 0 at 5 percent level. A joint 
F-test cannot reject that the quality of female and male candidates is similar across 
committees with different gender compositions.
We examine the causal impact of committees’ gender composition in column 3 of 
Table 1. In Italy, the proportion of women in committees has no significant impact 
on the success rate of male candidates and it has a significant negative impact on the 
relative chances of success of female candidates (upper panel). An additional female 
evaluator decreases the relative chances of success of female candidates by approx-
imately 1.8 pp ( β 2 = − 0.092 ,  ΔFemal e e = 1/5). In Spain, the share of female 
evaluators has a positive effect on the success rate of male candidates and a negative 
17 Results from probit estimations are very similar and are available upon request. We report the results for the 
linear probability model because interpreting the interaction effects is simpler. 
18 To ease the interpretation of coefficient  β 1 , we center  Femal e e expected at zero by subtracting its sample mean. 
19 In Italy, a random sequence of numbers was drawn and was then applied to several disciplines. In Spain, the 
random draw was carried out publicly on the same day for all disciplines and was certified by the notary. 
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effect on the success rate of female candidates, though these effects are not signifi-
cantly different from zero (lower panel).
To make estimates from Spain and Italy more comparable, it is useful to consider 
explicitly the upper and the lower bounds of a 95 percent confidence interval. In Italy, 
an additional woman in the committee decreases the success rate of female candidates 
relative to men by somewhere between 0.4 and 3.3 pp. In Spain, an extra woman on 
the committee can lower it by at maximum 1.0 pp but she can also increase it by up to 
0.5 pp. In sum, the impact that women in committees have upon the relative success 
rate of female candidates is negative and statistically significant only in the Italian 
case, but we cannot reject that the effect is statistically similar in the two countries.
Instrumental Variables Estimates.—To account for the resignation of some evalu-
ators before the actual evaluation took place, we instrument the final gender compo-
sition of the committee using as an instrument the initial composition determined by 
the random draw. Specifically, we estimate the following equation using the instru-
mental variables (IV) method:
(4)  Y ie  =  β 0 +  β 1 Femal e i +  β 2 Femal e e final +  β 3 Femal e i × Femal e e final 
 +  β 4 Femal e e expected +  β 5 Femal e i × Femal e e expected +  X i  β 6 +  ϵ ie ,
where  Femal e e final represents the share of female evaluators in the committee that 
evaluated candidates, and  Femal e e final and  Femal e i × Femal e e final are instrumented 
using  Femal e e initial and  Femal e i × Femal e e initial .
The first-stage results of the IV estimation show that there is a strong relation-
ship between the initial and the final gender composition of committees (see online 
Appendix Table D1). The IV estimates are slightly larger but very similar to the 
intention-to-treat estimates (column 4 of Table 1). To further increase the precision 
of these estimates, we also reestimate equation (4) including evaluation fixed effects. 
The estimates are slightly more accurate but they are (statistically) unchanged (col-
umn 5 of Table 1).
Table 2—Randomization Check
All
publications Articles Books Chapters Patents
Total
AIS
A-journal
articles
Coauthors
per article
Proportion
first-author
Proportion
last-author Age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Italy
Share of women 0.014 0.005 −0.023 −0.020 0.019 −0.005 0.038 0.017 −0.040 −0.011 −0.065
 in committee (0.034) (0.031) (0.031) (0.028) (0.021) (0.030) (0.027) (0.031) (0.023) (0.041) (0.035)
Female candidate −0.027 −0.001 0.059 0.048 −0.040 0.018 −0.087 −0.044 0.093 0.031 0.150
 × share of 
 women in 
 committee
(0.079) (0.071) (0.066) (0.063) (0.049) (0.064) (0.061) (0.067) (0.053) (0.088) (0.080)
Spain
Share of women −0.019 −0.029 0.004 0.002 0.024 −0.068 −0.023 −0.040 −0.020 −0.023 0.034
  in committee (0.030) (0.031) (0.022) (0.022) (0.015) (0.027) (0.022) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.034)
Female candidate 0.015 0.038 −0.017 −0.010 −0.062 0.152 0.043 0.103 0.045 0.042 −0.093
 × share of 
 women in 
 committee
(0.077) (0.078) (0.054) (0.055) (0.038) (0.068) (0.057) (0.076) (0.078) (0.080) (0.086)
Notes: OLS estimates. All regressions include also the variables female candidate, expected share of women in com-
mittee, and the interaction between the two. Standard errors are clustered by committee.
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Female and male evaluators differ in a number of dimensions. As shown in online 
Appendix Table C1, male evaluators tend to be relatively older, have longer tenure, 
and a longer publication record. They are also more likely to be based in the south 
of Italy and Spain. In order to check whether our results can be explained by these 
differences, we estimate equation (4) including the interaction between evaluators’ 
characteristics and candidates’ gender. The inclusion of these controls does not 
affect our previous estimates (Table 1, column 6).
The range of variation in gender composition that we exploit in our analysis is 
typically between committees with no women and committees with a minority of 
women. In online Appendix E we also show that within this range there are no sig-
nificant nonlinearities.
C. Does the Presence of Women in the Committee Affect  
Candidates’ Decision to Withdraw?
So far we have considered the initial sample of candidates. Some of these candi-
dates dropped from the evaluation process after committees were formed, perhaps 
because they anticipated that they had only a small chance to qualify and they pre-
ferred to avoid the costs associated to failure. These candidates did not receive an 
evaluation from the committee.
Therefore, the estimates above may in principle capture the effect that the gender 
composition of a committee has upon candidates’ decision to self-select into the 
process. To examine this issue, we use data from Italy and estimate equation (4) 
using as the dependent variable the indicator for those candidates who did not with-
draw their application. While relatively fewer women decided to go ahead with the 
application (−2.6 pp), these differences are not related to the share of female eval-
uators (Table 1, column 7). The evidence thus suggests that committees’ gender 
composition does not affect application decisions and its impact on the chances of 
success of candidates can be attributed to evaluations.
D. Does the Presence of Women in the Committee Affect  
the Quality of Promoted Candidates?
An additional justification for increasing female representation in committees 
might be that female researchers help to reduce evaluation biases and select better 
candidates, even though not necessarily more female candidates. To learn about the 
quality of the assessments, we compare the observable productivity of candidates 
who qualified in committees with different gender compositions:
(5)  q ie =  β 0 +  β 1 Femal e e final +  β 2 Femal e e expected +  ϵ ie ,
where  q ie is a proxy of candidate  i ’s quality, measured at the time of the evaluation 
or during the following five years. We estimate equation (5) for all qualified can-
didates, and then separately for females and males. We instrument the final gender 
composition of the committee ( Femal e final ) using the original one ( Femal e initial ).
We consider several proxies of quality. First, we consider the research output of 
successful candidates at the time of the evaluation. As shown in Table 3, candidates 
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that were promoted by committees with a different gender composition are at the 
time of the evaluation statistically similar in terms of the number of papers that they 
have published, the quality of the journals, the number of students advised or their 
participation in theses committees.
Using the Spanish data, we also examine the research productivity of successful 
candidates during the five-year period following the evaluation. Additionally, for 
the candidates who qualified to positions of associate professor, we check whether 
they succeeded in obtaining a qualification for full professorship. Once again, we 
see no evidence that the quality of candidates who qualify is related to the number 
of women who sat on these candidates’ evaluation committees. Overall, we do not 
observe any indication that committees with more female evaluators select better or 
worse candidates.
E. Individual Voting
We have documented that mixed-gender committees are not more favorable 
toward female candidates than all-male committees. This finding is consistent with 
several possibilities. It might be that female evaluators are not more favorable toward 
Table 3—Quality of Qualified Candidates
Publications Citations Total AIS
A-journal
articles
PhD students
advised
PhD thesis
committees
Success 
in future 
evaluations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Italy, before the evaluation
All 0.017 0.130 −0.055 −0.135(0.088) (0.117) (0.157) (0.255)
Women −0.044 0.139 0.154 −0.102(0.112) (0.143) (0.170) (0.317)
Men 0.029 0.098 −0.208 −0.213(0.101) (0.150) (0.211) (0.251)
Panel B. Spain, before the evaluation
All 0.022 0.072 −0.088 −0.200 0.125 −0.147(0.145) (0.223) (0.244) (0.237) (0.136) (0.132)
Women 0.210 0.469 −0.004 −0.142 0.580 0.053(0.206) (0.370) (0.399) (0.329) (0.229) (0.220)
Men −0.124 −0.242 −0.215 −0.219 −0.170 −0.303(0.193) (0.291) (0.301) (0.333) (0.176) (0.168)
Panel C. Spain, after the evaluation
All 0.016 −0.060 −0.098 −0.173 0.175 −0.086 0.042(0.132) (0.218) (0.227) (0.181) (0.135) (0.136) (0.052)
Women 0.345 −0.009 −0.102 0.170 0.119 −0.117 0.001(0.213) (0.356) (0.376) (0.288) (0.212) (0.231) (0.054)
Men −0.187 −0.140 −0.247 −0.266 0.080 −0.134 0.019(0.182) (0.281) (0.284) (0.252) (0.191) (0.186) (0.077)
Notes: OLS estimates for the sample of qualified candidates. Each coefficient corresponds to an independent regres-
sion for a given sample and dependent variable. In panels A and B the dependent variables are measured at the time 
of the evaluation. In panel C the dependent variables refer to the output in the five-year period following the eval-
uation. Success in future evaluations takes value 1 if a candidate who obtained a qualification for an associate pro-
fessorship in our sample qualifies in the evaluation for full professorship by year 2013. The dependent variables in 
columns 1–6 are normalized to have zero mean and unit variance for candidates within each exam. Citations and 
article influence score are only available for candidates in science, technology, engineering, mathematics, medi-
cine, and psychology. Information on publications in A-journals is only provided for candidates in social sciences 
and humanities. All regressions include nonparametric controls for expected share of women in the committee, dis-
ciplinary area × rank, and age. Standard errors are clustered by committee.
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female candidates than their male counterparts. Alternatively, maybe female eval-
uators are more sympathetic toward female candidates (or less unbiased) but their 
presence in the committee induces male evaluators to become less favorable toward 
female candidates. To shed light on this issue, we analyze the information provided 
by individual voting reports, available in Italy.
First, we compare the assessments of male and female evaluators sitting in the 
same committee. We estimate the following equation:
(6)  V ije =  β 0 +  β 1 Femal e j +  β 2 Femal e i × Femal e j +  μ ie +  ϵ ije ,  
where  V ije takes value 1 if evaluator  j casted a positive vote for candidate  i in evalu-
ation  e , and  Femal e i and  Femal e j are indicators that capture the gender of the candi-
date and the evaluator respectively. A vector of application fixed effects  μ ie captures 
any differences in application characteristics that are observable to all evaluators.
The empirical results suggest that, if anything, female evaluators are more favor-
able toward female candidates than male evaluators. Female candidates are 0.7 pp 
(1.6 percent) more likely to receive a positive vote from a female evaluator than 
from a male evaluator, although this difference is not statistically different from zero 
(Table 4, column 1). This estimate is likely to be a lower bound of the overall effect. 
Committee members share information and discuss their decision before casting 
their vote. A high fraction of committees reach unanimous decisions, suggesting 
that there may be less disagreement reflected in these final individual evaluations 
than there would have been at interim stages.
Another question that we would like to answer is whether the voting behavior of 
male evaluators changes when there are women on the committee. We estimate the 
following equation on the sample of assessments granted by male evaluators:
(7)  V ije =  β 0 +  β 1 Femal e i +  β 2 Femal e je final +  β 3 Femal e i × Femal e je   final 
  +  β 4 Femal e je expected +  β 5 Femal e i × Femal e je expected +  X i  β 4 +  ϵ ij ,  
where  Femal e je final and  Femal e je expected stand respectively for the actual and the 
expected share of women in a committee including evaluator  j .20 Coefficient  β 2 cap-
tures how the probability that a male candidate receives a positive vote from a male 
evaluator varies depending on the gender composition of the committee. Similarly, 
coefficient  β 3 captures how the presence of women in the committee affects the 
probability that a female candidate receives a positive vote from a male evaluator, 
relative to a male candidate.
There are three possible threats to the consistency of our estimates. First, similar 
to the analysis conducted in previous sections, the initial assignment of evaluators to 
committees should be random. As shown above, this assumption is satisfied. Second, 
we do not observe the assessments that would have been casted by evaluators who 
resigned (8 percent of initial evaluators). This might introduce a selection bias if 
20 We compute these expectations separately for each evaluator using the outcomes of one million simulated 
random draws that take into account the rules of the randomization. 
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resignations are related to the gender composition of the committee or to evaluators’ 
gender biases. We examine this possibility in online Appendix F. We do not find 
evidence suggesting that resignations are related to gender issues. Third, given that 
we only observe the evaluations received by candidates who did not withdraw their 
application (86 percent of applicants), a bias might arise if candidates’ withdrawal 
decision somehow depends on committees’ gender composition or gender biases. 
Our previous analysis shows that the gender composition of committees does not 
affect application decisions (see Section IIIC). As a robustness check, we also con-
sider an additional specification where we impute a negative assessment to every 
withdrawn application.
According to our estimates, each additional female evaluator in the committee 
increases the probability that a male candidate receives a positive vote from a male 
evaluator by 0.3 pp ( β 2 = 0.017 ,  ΔFemal e e final = 1/5 ) and it decreases the proba-
bility that a female candidate receives a positive vote, relative to a male candidate, 
by 0.8 pp ( β 3 = − 0.042 ,  ΔFemal e e final = 1/5 ), although these estimates are not 
significantly different from zero (Table 4, column 2). To increase the accuracy of 
the estimation, we also include evaluation fixed effects. According to this specifica-
tion, each additional woman in the committee reduces the probability that a female 
candidate receives a positive vote from a male evaluator by 1.2 pp ( β 3 = − 0.061 , ΔFemal e e  final = 1/5 ), relative to the probability that a male candidate receives a 
positive vote (column 3). This effect is significant at the 5 percent level. The  estimate 
Table 4—Individual Voting
All evaluators Male evaluators
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female candidate — −0.0004 0.008 −0.003
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Female evaluator −0.001
(0.007)
Female candidate × female evaluator 0.007
(0.005)
Share of women in committee 0.017 — —
(0.079)
Female candidate × share of women in committee −0.042 −0.061 −0.078
(0.043) (0.030) (0.030)
Controls
Application fixed effects Yes
Expected share of women Yes Yes Yes
Female candidate × expected share of women Yes Yes Yes
Candidate characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Exam fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 294,656 240,988 240,988 281,289
Notes: OLS estimates. The dependent variable is an indicator that takes value 1 if the evaluator casted a positive 
vote for a given candidate. Column 1 includes information from all individual evaluations, columns 2–4 include 
information only on evaluations by male evaluators. In column 4 we also include applications that were withdrawn 
after committee composition was announced, imputing a negative assessment to these applications. Candidate char-
acteristics include all predetermined characteristics listed in Table C2. Standard errors are clustered by committee.
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is slightly larger, around 1.6 pp, if we consider in our analysis also candidates who 
withdrew their application (column 4).
IV. Mechanisms
The two large-scale randomized natural experiments provide a clear result: 
increasing the proportion of women in scientific committees does not increase the 
success rate of female candidates. The analysis of individual votes within the com-
mittee suggests that this is due to two factors. On the one hand, female evaluators 
are slightly more likely to vote in favor of female candidates than male evaluators, 
but this effect is not economically or statistically significant. On the other hand, 
the presence of women in the committee decreases the probability that female can-
didates receive a positive vote from male evaluators. Next, we analyze these two 
issues in more detail.
A. Why Are Women Not More Supportive of Other Women?
The literature has emphasized several theoretical arguments according to which 
evaluators are expected to favor same-sex candidates. The most prominent ones are 
the existence of gender segregation across research networks, gender segregation 
across subfields of research, gender stereotypes, and discrimination against women 
attaining top positions. Next, we provide an in-depth examination of these theories 
and we try to understand why they do not play a more important role in our data.
Gender Segregation across Research Networks.—One of the arguments behind 
gender quotas is the existence of “old boy networks.” If professional connections 
with committee members help to achieve success and, at the same time, these con-
nections are gendered, female candidates might be at a disadvantage when eval-
uation committees do not include women. The relevance of “old boy networks” 
depends on three factors: (i) the extent to which networks are gendered, (ii) the 
likelihood that applicants are evaluated by a member of their network, and (iii) the 
magnitude of the connection premium.
First, we examine whether research networks in Spain and Italy are gendered. 
We consider all possible pairs between candidates and potential evaluators within a 
given field and we analyze whether the probability of being linked varies with their 
gender:
(8)  L  ij =  β 0 +  β 1 Femal e i +  β 2 Femal e j +  β 3 Femal e i × Femal e j +  μ e +  ϵ ij ,
where  L ij stands for any of the observable links between candidate  i and eligible 
evaluator  j . Variables  Femal e i and  Femal e j are indicators for female candidates and 
eligible evaluators, and  μ e are evaluation fixed effects.
As expected, links tend to be gendered. The  β 3 estimate is positive and significant 
in all specifications, indicating that, when a male eligible evaluator is substituted 
by a woman, female candidates’ likelihood of being connected increases relatively 
more than male candidates’ in every dimension (Table 5).
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In Italy, the likelihood of observing a female professor with the same affiliation 
as a female candidate is 0.6 pp (20 percent) larger than the likelihood of observing 
a similar link between a female professor and a male candidate.21 In Spain, female 
professors are 0.4 pp (8 percent) more likely to be in the same institution as a female 
candidate, relative to the probability of being affiliated to the same institution as 
a male candidate. Coauthorships are also relatively more likely when individuals 
share the same sex. In Italy, female professors are 0.3 pp (23 percent) more likely 
to coauthor with a female candidate than with a male one; in Spain the premium is 
equal to 0.1 pp (23 percent). Similarly, PhD supervisions and participation in PhD 
committees are also gendered. Female professors are 0.04 pp (33 percent) more 
likely to have a female advisee and 0.03 pp (3 percent) more likely to have partici-
pated in the same dissertation committee as a female candidate.
Another relevant factor is whether candidates benefit from the presence of a 
member of their network in an evaluation committee. Previous work by Zinovyeva 
and Bagues (2015) and Bagues, Sylos-Labini, and Zinovyeva (2015) document the 
existence of a substantial connection premium in qualification exams in Spain and 
Italy. However, while connections in evaluation committees might be useful, they 
are relatively rare in a context where evaluations are conducted at the national level. 
For instance, as pointed out in Section IIC, the probability that a candidate and 
an eligible evaluator are colleagues is around 3 percent in Italy and 5 percent in 
Spain. The probability that they are coauthors is even lower, around 1.4 percent in 
Italy and 0.4 percent in Spain. In sum, we observe a relative large degree of gen-
der segregation across networks and also a substantial connection premium, but the 
21 We have calculated this figure using the information reported in Table 5, column 1. The probability that 
a female professor and a female candidate in the Italian sample are affiliated to the same university is equal to 
3.34 percent (0.0026 + 0.0017 + 0.0029 + 0.0262), and the probability that a female professor and a male candi-
date are colleagues is equal to 2.79 percent (0.0017 + 0.0262). 
Table 5—Gender Segregation across Research Networks and Subfields
Italy Spain
Colleague Coauthor
Same 
subfield Colleague Coauthor
PhD 
Advisor
PhD 
committee
Research 
overlap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Female candidate 0.0026 0.0007 0.0209 −0.0012 −0.0003 −0.0001 −0.0010 0.0065
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0060) (0.0014) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0028)
Female evaluator 0.0017 −0.0015 −0.0067 0.0006 −0.0015 −0.0013 −0.0047 −0.0110
(0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0075) (0.0014) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0017)
Female candidate 0.0029 0.0022 0.0133 0.0043 0.0010 0.0005 0.0013 0.0042
 × female evaluator (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0045) (0.0016) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0022)
Constant 0.0262 0.0140 0.5897 0.0453 0.0045 0.0025 0.0142 0.1959
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0029) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0010)
Observations 2,555,839 2,555,839 1,373,825 5,445,067 5,445,067 5,445,067 5,445,067 4,711,621
Notes: OLS estimates. The number of observations corresponds to the number of possible pairs between candidates 
and eligible evaluators with nonmissing information in a given exam. In Italy, only evaluators who are based in an 
Italian university are considered. All regressions include evaluation fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by 
field.
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impact of these two factors is likely to be attenuated by the scarcity of connections 
in committees.22
Next, we study whether taking into account connections between candidates and 
evaluators affects our estimates of the impact of committees’ gender composition. 
We estimate the following equation:
(9)  Y ie  =  β 0 +  β 1 Femal e i +  β 2 Femal e i × Femal e e  final +  L ie  final  β 3 
 +  β 4 Femal e i × Femal e e expected +  L ie expected  β 5 +  X i  β 6 +  μ e +  ϵ ie ,
where  L ie  final is a vector including the different types of links between commit-
tee members and candidates. We also include as controls the expected proportion 
of links in the committee ( L ie expected ) and we instrument the final composition of 
the committee ( Femal e e final ,  L ie  final ) using the outcome of the initial lottery draw ( Femal e e initial ,  L ie initial ). The vector of coefficients  β 3 provides information about the 
causal impact of connections in the committee.
Table 6 reports the results of this analysis. In line with the findings of Zinovyeva 
and Bagues (2015) and Bagues, Sylos-Labini, and Zinovyeva (2015), we find that 
connections with evaluators are helpful for promotion. The presence of a colleague 
in the committee increases the success rate of connected candidates by 3.6  pp 
(10 percent) in Italy and by 4.6 pp (41 percent) in Spain.23 The impact of coauthors 
is larger: 4.7 pp (13 percent) in Italy and 12.8 pp (112 percent) in Spain. Candidates 
with an advisor in the evaluation committee also enjoy a premium of 9.0 pp (79 per-
cent) and when an evaluator has interacted previously with the candidate in some 
thesis committee the premium is around 2.5 pp (22 percent). However, the inclusion 
of connections as controls in the analysis does not affect significantly our estimates 
of the effect of evaluators’ gender on candidates’ success rate (columns 1 and 5 ver-
sus columns 2 and 6). As pointed out above, a plausible explanation for why connec-
tions, while being gendered, do not affect significantly our estimates may be related 
to their scarcity. For instance, in Italy the probability that a female candidate and a 
male evaluator are coauthors is around 1.4 percent. This probability increases by 0.1 
pp when the evaluator is also female. Taking into account the premium associated to 
the presence of a coauthor in the committee (4.7 pp), replacing a male evaluator by 
a female one translates into an increase in the average success rate of female candi-
dates by a mere 0.005 pp. Moreover, as we show in online Appendix G, evaluators’ 
support of connected candidates does not depend on their gender.
Gender Segregation across Research Subfields.—Another argument in favor of 
increasing the share of women in committees has been the potential existence of 
gender segregation across subfields. If committee members tend to prefer candidates 
22 There are may be also weaker links between candidates and evaluators, such as the existence of a common a 
coauthor. Zinovyeva and Bagues (2015) show that these indirect links tend also to be gendered but they do not have 
a significant impact on evaluation outcomes. 
23 To calculate these figures we take into account the number of committee members in Italy and Spain (5 and 
7, respectively) and the average success rate in each country (37 percent and 11 percent). For instance, in Italy the 
presence of a colleague in the committee has an impact of 3.6 pp ( β 3 = 0.181 ,  ΔFemal e e final = 1/5 ). Relative to an 
average success rate of 37 percent, this implies a 10 percent premium. 
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with similar research interests and, at the same time, men and women are segregated 
across research subfields, the lack of women in committees might hinder the ability 
of female candidates to succeed.
The extent of gender segregation across subfields is likely to depend on the level 
of aggregation at which evaluations are held. Segregation is probably larger when 
applicants are grouped in a few broadly defined fields. In the nationwide evaluations 
that we analyze in this paper, applicants were classified in approximately 200 differ-
ent fields (e.g., applied economics). We check whether, at this level of aggregation, 
candidates are more likely to have the same research interests as eligible evaluators 
of the same gender. We estimate equation (8) using as the dependent variable the 
research similarity between candidates and eligible evaluators. We observe gender 
segregation across research subfields in both countries but its magnitude is relatively 
small. In Italy, a female eligible evaluator is 1.3 pp relatively more likely to be in 
the same subfield as a female candidate than in the subfield of a male candidate. In 
Spain, the overlap between a female eligible evaluator and a female candidate is 
0.4 pp larger (Table 5, columns 3 and 8).
Table 6—Connections and Research Similarity
Italy Spain
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Female candidate 0.008 0.006 −0.008 −0.010 −0.011 −0.010 −0.011 −0.011
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Female candidate −0.128 −0.124 −0.061 −0.060 −0.016 −0.020 −0.017 −0.021
  × share of female evaluators (0.035) (0.035) (0.046) (0.046) (0.028) (0.028) (0.035) (0.035)
Connections in committee
Colleagues 0.181 0.180 0.319 0.319
(0.036) (0.044) (0.031) (0.031)
Coauthors 0.237 0.201 0.869 0.840
(0.048) (0.053) (0.140) (0.142)
PhD advisors 0.633 0.575
(0.107) (0.115)
PhD thesis committee 0.174 0.166
(0.037) (0.038)
Research similarity
Same subfield 0.046
(0.032)
Overlap in research interests 0.124
(0.037)
Controls
Expected connections Yes Yes Yes Yes
Expected same subfield Yes
Expected overlap in research interests Yes
Observations 69,020 69,020 35,832 35,832 31,243 31,243 27,998 27,998
Notes: IV estimates. All regressions include exam fixed-effects, an interaction between Female candidate and the 
Expected share of women in committee, and controls for all individual predetermined characteristics listed in online 
Appendix Table C2. Connection variables are measured in shares. PhD thesis committee refers to candidates and 
evaluators who have been members of the same doctoral thesis committee. Same subfield is the share of evaluators 
who belong to the same subfield (settore scientifico disciplinario) as the candidate. Overlap in research interests 
is based on evaluators’ and candidates’ participation in doctoral thesis committees, which are classified in 2,000 
different subfields (see more details in Section II). Expected connections is a vector including the expected share 
in the committee of colleagues, coauthors, advisors, and PhD thesis committee. Standard errors are clustered by 
committee.
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Research similarity with evaluators tends to increase candidates’ chances of suc-
cess, but the effect of female evaluators on female candidates’ relative success rate 
is unchanged when we control in the estimation for research similarity (Table 6, 
columns 3– 4 and 7–8). This is consistent with the relatively small level of gender 
segregation observed. In sum, gender segregation across research interests is too 
limited for female candidates to benefit significantly from more female evaluators 
in the committee.
Stereotypes.—An additional theoretical argument in favor of a higher female 
presence in evaluation committees is that senior male researchers might have ste-
reotypes against female candidates. If senior female researchers do not share these 
stereotypes, having more women on the committee might reduce the impact of gen-
der prejudices.
Stereotyping might be stronger when evaluators are less informed about candi-
dates’ quality. Given that it might be particularly difficult to assess the quality of 
candidates who do research in subfields that lie far away from evaluators’ knowl-
edge, we divide evaluations in two groups based on the distance between evaluators’ 
and candidates’ research interests. The evidence suggests that information asym-
metries matter, but the presence of women in the committee does not contribute to 
eliminate potential gender biases. When candidates and evaluators work in similar 
areas, evaluators’ gender does not have a significant impact (Table 7, first row). 
However, when candidates do research in a different subfield, female candidates 
tend to perform significantly worse when there are relatively more women in the 
committee. This pattern is observed in both countries.
It is also sometimes argued that stereotyping against women is stronger in sci-
ences and mathematics-related disciplines (Reuben, Sapienza, and Zingales 2014). 
We compare the effect of female evaluators in STEMM and SSH disciplines, but we 
do not observe any significant differences between these two groups neither in Spain 
nor in Italy (Table 7, second row).
One might also expect prejudices against women to be stronger in disciplines 
that are less feminized and, therefore, offer fewer chances to interact with female 
researchers. We examine separately disciplines with a relatively low and a relatively 
high proportion of women among full professors. We do not find any evidence sug-
gesting that evaluators in these two groups differ in terms of their preference for 
candidates of the same sex (Table 7, third row).24
High-Level Positions.—The impact of committees’ gender composition might 
also depend on the importance of the position at stake. Some male evaluators might 
be reluctant to see a female colleague at the top of the academic career ladder. They 
might hold negative stereotypes of women, for instance, regarding their leadership 
or other abilities specific to full professor positions. There might also be a problem 
of taste-discrimination.
24 In Table H1 in online Appendix H we report results from an alternative specification of heterogeneity tests. 
Instead of splitting the sample in two groups based on the overlap of candidates’ and evaluators’ research interests 
and on the degree of feminization of the discipline, we estimate a model with triple interactions exploiting the full 
range of possible values of these variables. Results from these alternative specifications are in line with the findings 
discussed in this section. 
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We examine separately the effect of female presence upon the evaluation com-
mittee for candidates to full and associate professor positions (Table 7, fourth row). 
We do not observe any significant differences between these groups of evaluations 
in Italy, but we do observe a significant difference between exams for full and asso-
ciate professorships in Spain. Specifically, it appears that in Spain, in committees 
assessing candidates to full professor positions, a higher female presence has a pos-
itive impact on female candidates’ relative chances of success. However, the oppo-
site is true in evaluations for promotion to more junior positions.
So, in the case of promotions to full professorships in Spain, but not in Italy, the 
result is consistent with the existence of stereotypes, or even of taste discrimination, 
against women by committees with low or no representation of women.
Analysis by Disciplinary Groups.—Beyond these theories, it might be that the 
gender composition of committees matters in some specific fields. The previous 
empirical literature of evaluators’ gender does not provide a clear pattern. Two arti-
cles that study the role evaluators’ gender in Science and Economics find that eval-
uators tend to prefer candidates of the same sex (Casadevall and Handelsman 2014; 
De Paola and Scoppa 2015), but in two other studies conducted in the same disci-
plines evaluators exhibit a preference for candidates of the other sex (Broder 1993; 
Ellemers et al. 2004). Six other articles in different fields do not find any significant 
relationship.25
25 See more details in online Appendix Table A1. 
Table 7—Heterogeneity Analysis
Italy Spain
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Research overlap  ≥ median  < median  ≥ median  < median 
0.011 −0.179 0.081 −0.125
(0.046) (0.066) (0.047) (0.044)
Discipline SSH STEMM SSH STEMM
−0.119 −0.133 −0.027 0.003
(0.058) (0.037) (0.039) (0.041)
Feminization of field  ≥ median  < median  ≥ median  < median 
−0.149 −0.072 −0.018 −0.016
(0.042) (0.057) (0.040) (0.037)
Level of promotion FP AP FP AP
−0.111 −0.138 0.120 −0.072
(0.059) (0.038) (0.054) (0.032)
Notes: IV estimates. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the candi-
date qualified. Each coefficient corresponds to an independent regression for the corresponding 
sample. Research overlap is a proportion of committee members with similar research inter-
est as defined in Section IID. SSH stands for social sciences and humanities, and STEMM for 
science, technology, engineering, mathematics, medicine, and psychology. Feminization of the 
field is measured by the proportion of women among full professors in the discipline. FP and AP 
stand, respectively, for full and associate professors. Standard errors are clustered by committee.
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Following the official classification of disciplines adopted by the Italian 
Ministry, we consider 16 different groups of disciplines: Industrial Engineering, 
Civil Engineering, Physics, Mathematics, Chemistry, Geology, Biology, Veterinary, 
Medicine, Psychology, Architecture, Economics and Business, Social Sciences, 
History, Languages, and Law. We estimate equation (4) separately for each group 
and each country, including evaluation fixed effects and instrumenting the final com-
position of the committee with the initial one. We report these estimates in Figure 1. 
Out of 32 coefficients, 28 are not significant, 1 is significantly positive, and 3 are 
significantly negative. When we take into account in the calculation of standard 
errors that we are running multiple regressions using a Bonferroni correction none 
of the coefficients remains significant. Altogether, it is not possible to reject that the 
impact is similar to zero in any of the different samples. Similarly, we cannot reject 
the hypothesis that the effect is similar across different fields.
B. Why Does the Presence of Women in the Committee Affect the Voting Behavior 
of Male Evaluators?
There are at least three potential explanations. The presence of women in the 
committee might unleash a backlash against female candidates, particularly in fields 
that have been historically dominated by men (Crocker and McGraw 1984). While 
we cannot directly test this hypothesis, we do not observe any significant difference 
in the impact of committees’ gender composition depending on the degree of femi-
nization of the field (see Table 7, third row).
The presence of female evaluators might also induce a licensing effect (Monin 
and Miller 2001). In all-male committees, evaluators may feel that they have a 
moral obligation to worry about sexism and seek to overcome it by expressing more 
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Figure 1. The Causal Impact of Committees’ Gender Composition, by Disciplinary Group
Notes: The figure reports the effect of a higher proportion of women among evaluators on the relative success rate 
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 positive (and perhaps less discriminatory) views about female candidates. When 
there are women on a committee, men may feel licensed to express more honest 
opinions about female candidates. Furthermore, female evaluators might strengthen 
male identities within committees and hence weaken their support for female can-
didates (Akerlof and Kranton 2000). Unfortunately, we cannot disentangle empiri-
cally these two competing hypotheses, licensing effect, and male identity priming.
V. Conclusions
A larger presence of women in scientific committees is frequently defended in pol-
icy discussions. This paper contributes to this debate by providing a comprehensive 
and systematic analysis of the impact of scientific committees’ gender composition. 
We exploit the exceptional evidence provided by qualification evaluations for full 
and associate professorships in every discipline in two different countries, Italy and 
Spain. These evaluations involved around 100,000 applications and 8,000 evaluators 
in all academic fields. The random assignment of evaluators to committees creates a 
setting of large-scale natural randomized experiments. We also take advantage of the 
availability of very detailed information about candidates, evaluators, and the content 
of evaluations in order to analyze explicitly the theoretical arguments that are usually 
employed in support of a higher representation of women in scientific committees.
In general, the presence of female evaluators in the committee neither increases 
the success rate of female candidates, nor does it alter the quality of selected can-
didates. Strikingly, in all but one subsamples we observe the opposite pattern in 
success rates: committees with a higher women share tend to be relatively less favor-
able toward female candidates. The only exception refers to evaluations to full pro-
fessorships in Spain, where female candidates have better chances of success when 
evaluated by a committee with more women.
Information from individual votes within committees suggests that there are two 
factors that explain why a larger presence of women does not increase the success 
rate of female candidates. First, while female committee members are slightly more 
favorable toward female candidates than their male colleagues, this effect is not eco-
nomically or statistically significant. Second, male evaluators become less favorable 
toward female candidates when women are present in the committee, perhaps due to 
a licensing effect or to male identity priming.
Two common arguments that are usually employed in support of a higher repre-
sentation of women in scientific committees—gendered networks and segregation 
across subfields—do not play an important role in our data. We document the exis-
tence of gender segregation across research networks in both countries. A female 
candidate is significantly more likely to be connected to a female evaluator, as mea-
sured by coauthorships, affiliation, doctoral thesis supervision, and participation in 
theses committees. We also observe that committees tend to favor connected candi-
dates. However, in the nationwide evaluations that we consider in this paper the like-
lihood of connections between candidates and evaluators is small and, therefore, the 
impact of gendered networks on evaluations is very modest. We also find that eval-
uators have a preference for candidates with similar research interests but the extent 
of gender segregation within each field is relatively small. As a result, the impact of 
gender segregation on evaluation outcomes is very limited. Another justification for 
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increasing the presence of women in committees is that male evaluators may hold 
stereotypes that have a negative effect upon female candidates. In order to explore 
the potential impact of gender stereotypes, we focus on cases where information 
asymmetries are expected to be important. Our results indicate that the gender of 
evaluators only matters when evaluators are not familiar with candidates’ research. 
However, in this case gender-mixed committees are less favorable toward women 
than all-male committees.
It remains an open question how the specific institutional characteristics of the 
Italian and the Spanish promotion systems affect the role of committees’ gender 
composition. Overall, we cannot reject that the estimates for both countries are sta-
tistically similar, but we observe a significant difference in the behavior of commit-
tees evaluating applications to full professor positions. In Italy, a larger presence 
of men in the committee increases the chances of success of female applicants. On 
the contrary, in Spain female applicants to full professorships tend to be relatively 
less successful when evaluated by an all-male committee. It is unclear whether this 
difference reflects random sampling or whether it captures some institutional or 
country-specific characteristic.26
Our analysis may be relevant for the design of policies aimed at increasing the 
representation of women in the academic career. Several countries, including Spain, 
have introduced quotas in scientific committees requiring the presence of a mini-
mum share of male and female evaluators. According to our results, in general, a 
higher representation of women in scientific committees per se does not increase the 
number of promoted female candidates, nor does it help candidates who prove to 
be more productive in the future. Introducing gender quotas indiscriminately might 
also have unintended consequences. Quotas may be detrimental for senior female 
researchers, who would have to spend a disproportionate amount of time sitting on 
committees and, in some cases, for junior ones, whose chances of success may be 
hindered.
To be sure, gender quotas could be desirable in certain cases. The analysis sug-
gests that the prevalence of gender segregation across subfields might be an import-
ant determinant of whether female committee representation is likely to help female 
candidates. We expect gender segregation to play a more important role when eval-
uations are held at a more aggregate level than the one considered here.27 Another 
important factor is the potential existence of connections between evaluators and 
candidates. These connections, which tend to be gendered, are likely to be more rel-
evant in committees at the university- or department-level. More empirical work is 
needed to understand the impact of gender quotas in those contexts. Moreover, there 
are certain features of gender quotas that are not captured by our analysis. Evaluators 
who are explicitly chosen to represent a minority might behave  differently, perhaps 
26 Some authors have argued that the degree of transparency in an evaluation procedure can affect gender biases 
(van den Brink, Benschop, and Jansen 2010). Hence, one possible explanation is that the higher level of transpar-
ency and public scrutiny of the Italian system deterred male evaluators from discriminating against female appli-
cants to full professor positions. 
27 The level of disaggregation at which scientific evaluations are held varies largely across countries and insti-
tutions. For instance, the European Research Council groups applications in 25 broadly defined areas (http://erc.
europa.eu/evaluation-panels, accessed September 1, 2015), while in the National Institutes of Health (NIH), which 
considers only life sciences, grant applications are evaluated by 174 different “study sections” (http://public.csr.
nih.gov/StudySections/Standing/Pages/default.aspx, accessed September 1, 2015). 
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being more inclined to take a positive view of candidates belonging to their own 
group. The introduction of quotas may also affect the strategic incentives of evalu-
ators. Nonetheless, keeping in mind these limitations, our results cast doubts on a 
generalized implementation of gender quotas in scientific committees.
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